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May Hongmei Gao

Kennesaw State University

THE SIX-TIER COMMUNICATION GAP
FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AFTER
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM THE CASE OF DURACELL AND NANFU
Abstract
The importance of cultural factors as antecedents of post-acquisition integration has been recognized in previous research. Nevertheless, there are not
many case studies on the post–merger and acquisition (M&A) integration
process of USA-based multinational corporations (MNCs) acquiring Chinese
companies. This article summarizes lessons in communication learned from
the integration process between Duracell and Nanfu, the two battery giants
from the US and China. In 2003, the Gillette Company, who owned Duracell,
acquired Nanfu. In 2005, Gillette was acquired by Procter and Gamble (P&G),
and the management of Nanfu remains to be coordinated by Duracell. This
case embodies the interplay of two national cultures (China and the US) and
four organizational cultures (P&G, Gillette, Duracell, and Nanfu). Data from
interviews and participant observations with American and Chinese managers
and engineers, and Chinese consumers indicate a complex post-acquisition
integration process. The article proposes a six-tier American-Chinese communication gap to be overcome for any MNCs in their post-acquisition integration after cross-border transactions between the US and China: Directness
vs. Subtleness; Aggressiveness vs. Modesty; Courtesy vs. Command; Different
connotations of the same concepts; Competitive vs. Obliging Conflict Management Styles; “Rule-based” vs. “Good will-based” working atmosphere.
The case study on the Duracell-Nanfu case demonstrates that MNCs need to
provide comprehensive intercultural training for its multinational teams for
more effective communication and higher productivity after M&As.
Keywords: Chinese culture, American culture, M&A (merger and
acquisition), P&G (Procter and Gamble), Duracell, Nanfu, post-acquisition
integration, cross-border transactions, communication gap
Part I: Introduction
Since the 1990s, following the deepening of the economic reform and deregulation of the market in Mainland China, acquiring established Chinese
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companies has become a shortcut for international companies to quickly
establish a strong market position in China. However, for multinational corporations (MNCs), mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China are particularly
challenging. To be successful, MNCs operating globally need to overcome
challenges in dealing with different cultures, languages, rules and regulations,
and tax systems. Misunderstandings in communication and culture can lead
to conflict and financial losses.
In 2003, the Gillette Company, owner of the world’s top consumer battery brand Duracell, took over a controlling stake of up to 70% in Fujian
Nanping Nanfu Battery Co., Ltd., located in southern China. The acquisition
gave Gillette a top Chinese battery brand of Nanfu (南孚), a state-of-the-art
manufacturing plant, and a national distribution network with over 3 million
retail outlets throughout China. In addition, the acquisition gave Gillette a
dominant position in China’s battery market, since Nanfu accounts for more
than 40% of China’s alkaline battery sales (Battery grant, 2003). Prior to 2003,
Duracell was an insignificant player in the Chinese battery market, occupying
only 10% of the market share. Two years later, in 2005, Procter and Gamble
(P&G) acquired Gillette. Consequently, P&G gained control of the majority
of shares of Nanfu. Both Gillette and P&G gave Duracell leadership power
over Nanfu, making Duracell the de facto “supervisor” for Nanfu since its
acquisition in 2003. However, in the eyes of the Chinese management team at
Nanfu, Duracell was a former inferior competitor who became the “supervisor” of Nanfu through acquisition. This fact was hard to accept. Interview
data shows that this attitude from the Nanfu side, and the lack of sufficient
communication between Duracell and Nanfu in post-acquisition integration,
created much misunderstanding and operational conflict between the two
companies for many years.
“Mergers fail more often than marriages,” said Voigt (2009). While the current divorce rates vary between 40% and 59% in North America and Western
Europe (Divorces, 2013), 70% of M&As fail to increase shareholder values
worldwide (Mohibullah, 2009). A study by the Hay Group (2007) found that
more than 90% of M&As in Europe fail to reach financial goals. Researchers
agree that M&As fail frequently (Dauber, 2011; Hofstede, 2010; Mohibullah,
2009). Most analysts found the incompatibility of the two partnering corporate cultures to be the most significant reason for their breakdown (Uljin,
Duysters, & Fevre, 2010). Was the acquisition of Nanfu by Gillette a smart
decision? Were there any intercultural business communication challenges
between the Chinese teams and the American teams after the acquisition? I
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conducted a seven-year longitudinal study from 2007 to 2013 on the DuracellNanfu case and my findings illustrate the lessons in communication learned
from this M&A.
The purpose of this article is three fold: First, it focuses on the postacquisition integration process by analyzing the case of Gillette, Duracell’s
parent company, acquiring the Chinese company Nanfu in 2003. This process
implied the interplay of two national cultures (Chinese and American) and
four organizational cultures (Duracell, Gillette, P&G, Nanfu). Second, this
article reveals opportunities and challenges in post-acquisition integration
in the Chinese marketplace through the study of the Duracell-Nanfu case.
Finally, it seeks to identify cultural elements that contribute to intercultural
communication gaps between the Chinese teams and the American teams
after a M&A. The lesson learned in this case can be transferrable to other
M&A cases that involve Chinese and American cultures.
The terms merger and acquisition need to be defined. An acquisition is
defined as one company taking a controlling interest (over 50%) of another
company, regardless of the sizes of the companies (Butler, Ferris, & Napier,
1991). The term merger refers to a combination of equal-sized firms, in which
no one party can clearly be seen as the acquirer (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991;
Søderberg & Vaara, 2003). Often in existing literature the two terms merger
and acquisition are used interchangeably (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991;
Sarala, 2009). Teerikangas and Very (2006) argue that such loose definitions
of mergers and acquisitions have led to an ill-defined focus in merger and
acquisition studies. However, since the focus of this longitudinal study on
the Duracell-Nanfu integration case is on the integration of two companies
rather than on the control factor, relevant literature in both mergers and acquisitions was consulted.
Part II: Research Method
Although the acquisition of Nanfu by Gillette for Duracell happened in 2003, a
literature survey showed that there are no extensive and specific investigations
on this acquisition regarding the challenges in communication involved in
the post-acquisition integration process. In global business and intercultural
communication analyses, case study is a widely used methodology when a
holistic in-depth investigation is needed. To conduct case studies in an effective way, many different methodologies have been developed, such as
grounded theory, survey research, focus groups, or content analysis. Case
studies require a multi-perspective analysis, and thus triangulation of methods
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is commonly used. Given the nature of this study, the triangulation methodology was adopted (Yin, 2003). Four sources of data were used, combining
secondary data, in-depth interviews, and participant observation:
• Information from official websites: Nanfu Batteries (http://www.nanfu.
com/en), Duracell (http://www.duracell.com), Gillette (http://www.gillette.
com), and P&G (http://www.pg.com).
• Online secondary data from both English and Chinese websites: Though
online information may have credibility issues, I used information from wellknown and credible sites. China Daily, The People’s Daily, Sohu Finance,
and The Wall Street Journal are among those online sources quoted.
• In-depth interview data: From 2007 to 2011, in a span of 5 years, a total
of 43 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with top executives and engineers at both Duracell and Nanfu, as well as with electronics
store managers and Chinese battery consumers in China. (See table 1 for
interviewee distribution.)
Table 1: Interviewee Distribution
Interview
totals: 43

Position

Time of
Interview

Location of
Interview

3

Midlevel Managers, Nanfu

July 2007

Nanping, China

10

Engineers, Nanfu

July 2008

Nanping, China

2
1

Managers, R&D Division, Nanfu
Corporate Executive, Gillette

13

Engineers, Duracell

2

Managers, Duracell

5

Battery consumers in China

July 2008
May 2007
May 2007/
July 2007/
June 2009
May 2007/
June 2009

July 2009/
August 2010

1

White Elephant Battery Manager

July 2007

3

Corporate Executives, P&G

May 2007
August 2009
April 2011

3

Chinese electronic retail store
managers

July 2009/
August 2010

Nanping, China
LaGrange, GA,
USA
LaGrange, GA,
USA
LaGrange, GA,
USA
Beijing, China
Hefei, China

Shanghai, China
Beijing, China
Hefei, China

LaGrange, GA,
USA
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• Notes from participant observation: From 2007 to 2011, I was invited
as a consultant to teach effective intercultural communication in Georgia
(USA) and in China. I took detailed notes while observing the progression
of integration involving Duracell, Nanfu, Gillette, and P&G.
Part III: Research Findings
Good-Enough Market for Nanfu in China
Historically, MNCs have focused on China’s premium markets, and D
 uracell’s
market positioning was no exception in 2003. However, MNCs sticking
with a premium-only strategy are increasingly under attack from Chinese
competitors with a compelling offering: fairly reliable products at prices
low enough to attract China’s growing ranks of mid-level consumers. In
fact, in the mid-2000s, the “good-enough market,” which was a huge segment of lower-end—but acceptable—products, with unbeatable prices, was
emerging in China. Indeed, China’s middle market is growing faster than
both the premium and low-end segments (see figure 1). In some categories,
the “good-enough market” accounts for nearly half of all revenues (Gadiesh
& Vestring, 2006).

Figure 1: Market segmentation based on product quality

After the acquisition of Nanfu in 2003, Gillette protected both Duracell’s
and Nanfu’s brands in their respective segments, and leveraged cost synergies, economies of scale, and superior distribution to significantly increase
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operating margins in China. “The two have their own product features and
brand value. I guess, Gillette won’t kill the Nanfu brand since Nanfu has a
significant number of loyal customers in China,” said Mr. Miao Xiushu of
Shanghai White Elephant Swan Battery Co., Ltd. in 2003. Gillette continued
to sell premium batteries under the Duracell brand, and maintained Nanfu
as the leading national brand for the mass market, the good-enough market.
Dual branding, cost synergies, broadened product portfolio, and distribution
to more than 3 million retail outlets in China was successful for Gillette.
In addition, to maintain Duracell and Nanfu each in its position, the Gillette Company and P&G needed to restrain Nanfu’s global ambition. As the
“national power,” it had planned overseas expansion. Nanfu was advised by
Duracell to focus on the domestic Chinese market, to avoid head-on competition with Duracell in the foreign market (Boarding the pirate ship, 2005). For
some Chinese intellectuals, Nanfu’s eventual acquisition by P&G was seen
as a tragedy of “National Power.” It was said that in 1999, Nanfu was forced
to seek a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by the local Nanping government,
even in the context of no additional funding needed. However, the local government said: “Nanfu is still in Nanping, and it still generates jobs and tax
to the local economy. We are pleased with that result” (Nanfu battery, 2013).
Six-Tier Communication Gap
In 2003 when Nanfu was acquired by Gillette, Nanfu owned 40% of the
market share in battery products in China. Interview data shows that in the
perspective of the Nanfu management team, Nanfu was acquired by Gillette,
partly because Duracell could not compete with Nanfu in market share and
product price. In 2007, Duracell occupied only 10% of the Chinese market.
However, P&G gave 100% coordination authority to Duracell to manage
Nanfu. Since Nanfu “belonged” to Duracell, Nanfu was somewhat forced
to purchase high cost equipment within fiscal years by spending “The Year
End Fund.” Nanfu’s Research and Development (R&D) managers were not
happy, and I observed this incident at a Nanfu factory campus in China.
The Nanfu team’s argument was that Nanfu had been following the Chinese
value of frugality, and the company had been able to keep a low cost and
high yield production. However, after many rounds of bilingual reports to
the US Duracell headquarters, Nanfu’s purchasing department was obliged
to follow the Americans’ directives and purchase expensive equipment made
in Pennsylvania, USA. Nanfu R&D managers were worried about losing
their efficiency in low-cost production, but they lacked the channel for expressing themselves. They faced “powerful” American bosses, and did not
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want to challenge their authority. After the acquisition by Gillette in 2003,
many sets of equipment were purchased, but not used at Nanfu (Boarding
the pirate ship, 2005).
Intercultural misunderstandings and conflicts were omnipresent in daily
communication between managers and engineers from Duracell and Nanfu
for over ten years. The interview data and participant observation notes uncovered a six-tier intercultural communication gap between the two teams
from the American and Chinese cultures. These were directness-subtleness,
aggressiveness-modesty, courtesy-command, different interpretations of
concepts, competitive-obliging, and rule-based vs. good-will-based working atmosphere. The in-depth interviews revealed that the different belief
systems of the Chinese and Americans affected the ways they behaved and
communicated in the post-M&A integration process.
Tier #1: Directness (US) vs. Subtleness (China)
Gudykunst and Kim (2003) state that people who have Asian languages as
their first language tend to communicate in a more indirect fashion when
speaking English. The Chinese appear to be subtle and ambiguous in their
expression partly because the Chinese communication style is high-context
oriented (Hall, 1976), with most of the information embedded in the physical
context or internalized in the person, and very little in the coded message.
In the Chinese culture, what is most important is sometimes not said, and
subtlety is valued as a virtue. On the contrary, Americans are more direct in
communication (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003). As a result, subtle meanings that
the Chinese try to convey might be ignored or misunderstood by American
partners, and a straightforward expression of the Americans may be overanalyzed by the Chinese in their subtle mindset. Consequently, the subtleness
of the Chinese communication style becomes a communication obstacle.
Liu, a 38-year-old researcher at Nanfu said: “I think that Americans are
more open than us. It is easy to communicate with Americans because they
are direct. They will tell you either they agree with you or disagree with
you frankly.” James, a 42-year-old manager from Nanfu agreed: “I think
Americans are very straightforward. There are fewer mind games going on.”
In summary, the Chinese perceive a multi-layered explanation contained in
their American employers’ expressions. With a relatively indirect thinking
pattern, the Chinese might face challenges when working with Americans.
Chinese employees need to be aware of the more open, direct, and linear
style of communication used by their American colleagues and supervisors.
At the same time, American supervisors should consider the complex ways
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of interpreting messages of the Chinese employees and try to understand
inevitable communication problems.
Tier #2: Aggressiveness (US) vs. Modesty (China)
According to Hofstede (1980), one way in which Asian cultures are different from American culture is in individualism-collectivism. US culture is
individualistic, whereas Asian cultures are collectivistic. In individualistic
cultures, individuals take precedence over groups; in collectivistic cultures,
groups take precedence over individuals. Consequently, while Americans
communicate assertively, the Chinese tend to be modest in talking about
themselves. Moreover, in a collectivist culture, one is encouraged to talk
about the group rather than oneself. A talkative person, with no “true knowledge,” is sometimes characterized as a “noisy half-filled vinegar bottle” who
is criticized by the public. Such popular Chinese sayings as “Eloquence may
be silver, but silence is gold” influence the Chinese mindset.
Valuing silence and modesty can be an issue for a Chinese team working
with American bosses and colleagues. Modest Chinese colleagues might appear to be humble, timid, or shy. Usually Chinese employees feel inhibited
from talking about themselves and offering constructive opinions. At corporate
meetings, one’s strength is partly dependent on his/her self-marketing skill.
If this skill is underdeveloped for cultural reasons, the synergy between the
Chinese and American employees cannot grow. In collectivistic societies such
as China, people are hierarchically related, and social interaction is strongly
defined by age, gender, and social status. As a result, Chinese employees
listen to American employers respectfully without asserting themselves. This
tendency can be a hindrance for American supervisors in recognizing Chinese
employees’ accomplishments, as well as their creativity.
Tier #3: Courtesy (US) vs. Command (China)
Power distance is another typology in Hofstede’s (1980) 5 dimensions of
cultural differences. Power distance measures the extent to which inequalities among people are seen as normal and accepted at different hierarchical
layers of a society. On this index, the Chinese culture scores high, while the
American culture scores low. The hierarchical Confucian world-order influences the Chinese to practice a command-obey format of communication,
commonly in a downward direction, when a task is given. Interview data
shows that this tendency was recognized by some of the American employees
when they were communicating with their Chinese counterparts. The Chinese might choose a seemingly blunt, simple, and unpolished “command”
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style of speech in an interaction, such as: “You should do this!” “Tell me as
soon as possible!” “When will you make a decision?” To Americans, such
expressions lack politeness.
On the contrary, in a low-power-distance culture like the US, people strive
to treat each other with courtesy. Individuals typically attempt to address
each other as equals in a horizontal, rather than hierarchical structure. When
Americans give suggestions, they strive not to be authoritative: “If I were you,
I would …” or “I suggest …” or “In my opinion, you might want to consider
…” Therefore, to Americans, Chinese appear to be blunt and insensitive
to word choice, and the Chinese team might offend their co-workers from
America by using too much of the command style of expression. In 2008,
Nick, a 47-year-old engineer from South Carolina who worked for Duracell,
was sent to Nanping, China, once every two weeks to work with the Chinese
team. When he was not in China, he communicated with his Chinese counterparts via email, in English. Nick complained: “I am a Southern gentleman,
and all throughout my life, nobody has ever given me commands about what
I ‘should’ do. However, I often receive emails from China, starting with such
phrases, telling me I should do this, or I should do that.” Chris from Atlanta
echoed: “I think Chinese are sometimes too abrupt …” Americans would say,
“If I were you, I would do this, but the Chinese don’t. It is more courteous.
This might be superficial, but courtesy makes people feel better.” For all of
the Chinese employees who communicate with Americans, English is a second language. Most of them are not proficient in English, and have a limited
vocabulary. Since Americans from Duracell usually do not speak Chinese,
English is the only language of communication. To the Chinese, a phrase like
“You should …” is simply a way to make their meaning clear, not knowing
that it causes more confusion from the American standpoint.
Tier #4: Different connotations of the same concepts
Usually, foreign visitors lack first-hand experience and knowledge about the
local culture, which creates an obstacle in understanding each other, even when
the language is not a barrier. When Americans work in China, they lack firsthand Chinese experience. Such a deficiency posed a challenge for the Chinese
and American teams in daily interactions. Such a gap is difficult to bridge,
even if one strives to do so by reading books and consulting other sources.
Kyle, a 44-year-old manager from Duracell, reminded me that intercultural
life differences may be a global teamwork obstacle: “On my business trips
to China, I just feel like I have very limited common topics with them, such
as everyday casual things that you share … I actually want to catch up with
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them. However, our different life experiences present different pictures for
the same word. For example, in China, when they mention ‘lunch,’ I would
quickly think of a sandwich or a hamburger, whereas my Chinese colleagues
might have the image of a fish floating in a hot pot.” Thirty-year-old Mr.
Zhen from Nanfu suggested that American engineers and managers needed
to learn more about Chinese customs and respect the local Fujian culture, in
order not to offend people at Nanfu. He suggested: “I think you need to pay
attention to Chinese culture, family, history, our food culture, our respect for
elders, and learn some Chinese language. I, personally, enjoy learning about
such topics, about America in general. Like this, you can find lots of common topics with your Chinese colleagues.” Although it is a fact that Chinese
and American team members grew up in different cultural contexts, it is
still possible for both parties to learn about each other’s cultures and values.
With much American popular culture being globalized, it can be a functional
topic when communicating with younger Chinese people. The interview
data shows that the younger generation in China is quite familiar with such
topics as the NBA, Hollywood movies, the Rolling Stones’ music, and top
American brand names. In the meantime, it is helpful for Americans to learn
some Chinese culture and respect local traditions. The interview data shows
that Chinese employees of Nanfu in Nanping had unfavorable impressions
of some American expatriates from Duracell, who spent most of their leisure
time in Fuzhou, the nearby metropolitan city, instead of being with their
Chinese team members in rural Nanping.
Tier #5: Competitive (US) vs. Obliging (China)
Conflict Management Styles
While I was doing research in Nanfu in 2007, I learned that the conflict in
management style differences between the Chinese and Americans was hard
to reconcile. Being modest and obliging is a traditional virtue in China, while
being competitive is a common Western, especially American, practice when
dealing with conflict. Chinese companies tend to take the underdog position in
international conflict and pay the price “for peace.” Ting-Toomey, Gao, Yang,
Kim, Lin, and Nishida (1991) suggest that these two orientations are based on
different cultural values involving identity and face saving. One particularly
sensitive issue is deciding upon expenses. Since Nanfu is “supervised” by
Duracell, Nanfu is forced to adopt the “expensive” habits of Duracell, even
though Nanfu’s managers would do otherwise. The purchase of expensive
US equipment put Nanfu R&D managers in a difficult situation, since their
non-confrontational management style together with the perception of “im-
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posing” American behavior contradicts their principles of non-competing and
hierarchy-differing styles of interaction.
In international transaction and conflict management, if Chinese corporations maintain an attitude of being obliged, their Western counterparts will
become even more aggressive. Perhaps the Chinese companies need to reexamine their modesty tradition and adopt more competitive management
skills.
Tier #6: “Rule-based” (US) vs. “Good will-based” (China)
working atmospheres
While Americans stick to the agreed-upon rules and procedures, the Chinese
put more faith in personal relationships rather than in written rules and procedures. To avoid direct confrontation or losing “face” can lead to decisions
that are made with no respect for rules. This is important information when
doing business with the Chinese. In China, business becomes often secondary
when a good social relationship must be established first. One cannot expect
a contract before the social network is established.
Mr. Zhang, a mid-level manager at Nanfu, said that they are not used to
having their computers checked once a month by a third party, since they
perceive this as a lack of trust by Duracell. It is unimaginable in China for
managers’ computers to be checked by third parties, just to see whether they
are loyal to the company.
Mr. Wang, the Assistant to the General Manager, said that after the acquisition, life changed. The managers of Nanfu had to write multiple reports in
order to buy company cars, while in the past, they could make such minor
decisions quickly. He said that to have a luxury company car can strengthen
the “face” of the company and bring business deals. In China there is a rising
class of nouveau riche, and one needs to have a luxury car, which is considered a successful-looking “Xingtou”1 (行头). Xingtou, a term borrowed
from the Peking Opera, represents the totality of one’s appearance, including
one’s clothing with brand names, watch, cell phone, and car. Such a total
image creates a perception of success or failure for class-conscious business
1 Xingtou (行头): Peking Opera costumes are called Xingtou or, more popularly,
Xifu (戏服) in Chinese. The origins of Peking Opera costumes can be traced back to
the mid-fourteenth century, when operatic precursors first began to experiment with
large, ornate articles of clothing. Such clothing is part of the total appearance of different characters (Xingtou, 2014). The interplay of “Xingtou” and “face” in Chinese
culture fuels conspicuous consumption in China nowadays.
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p artners and competitors. However, it was difficult for P&G to approve luxury
company cars for Nanfu personnel because of fiscal regulations made in the
US. The CEO of Nanfu downplayed his power: “I am just a professional
manager, I am not a boss.” Many emerging Chinese companies operate based
on interpersonal good will, while MNCs have a standardized set of rules.
Part IV: Conclusions and Discussions
Most organizational changes generate stress due to misunderstanding
and ambiguity. Mergers and acquisitions represent a particularly stressful
change, given the large-scale nature of this transformation. The acquisition
of the Chinese company Nanfu by the Gillette Company was a direct result
of globalization, and the road to post-acquisition integration of Nanfu and
Duracell was not smooth. However, individuals from different organizational
and national cultures can be trained to overcome cultural barriers with increased intercultural sensitivity (Hammer, Bennett, & Wiseman, 2003; Bennett, 2009). At the same time, cultural differences can lead to learning and
an increased knowledge base resulting from diversity. This is especially the
case for international acquisitions where differences in beliefs, values, and
practices may foster learning and innovation (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998).
The central part of such learning is usually “knowledge transfer” (Bresman,
Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999). For example, Duracell could have listened more
to the management of Nanfu. If Nanfu has survived and thrived so well in the
Chinese battery market, there is strength and a “niche” in this organizational
culture. The new “parent company” can gain new ideas from the acquired
companies, instead of imposing its own corporate culture unconditionally.
Vaara, Sarala, Stahl, & Bjorkman (2010) argue that different beliefs, values,
and practices are related to the different forms of knowledge that may be useful
for the other party. International acquisitions provide access to a potentially
valuable repository of knowledge and capabilities embedded in the local
environment of the merging organizations. Acquisitions in culturally distinct
countries are more valuable because a greater cultural distance makes it more
likely that the target firm will have capabilities that are significantly different from the acquirer’s own set. Thus the two companies complement each
other (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). In the case of Duracell and Nanfu,
Nanfu certainly embodies local market knowledge of Chinese employees,
consumers, and life styles. Duracell could have been more successful if its
management had tried to learn more from Nanfu.
Hammer et al. (2003) and Bennett (2009) propose a series of activities
that can improve the cultural awareness of the employee. Among them is the
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exposure to different organizational and national cultures. Some companies
have already established informal activities such as Friday afternoon lunches,
birthday parties, or weekend picnics. The employees from the acquired company can learn about these practices and be encouraged to participate. Another
important opportunity is to offer employees from both companies the chance
to create partnerships, such as dyads or teams for common projects. As such,
they have the opportunity to develop a sense of closeness and trust, and to
overcome unspoken animosities usually inherent in the post-integration process. Moreover, leaders should appoint mid-level managers who are culturally
sensitive (Hofstede, 2010).
As most sources of conflict in the post-integration process are cultural in
nature, Fink (2008) suggests that to increase the chances of success, one should
try to hybridize a new organizational culture. “Hybridization is the process
of blending organizational cultures and management knowledge to transform
an acquisition into a new socially viable system with a sustainable culture”
(p. 10). Tomlinson (1999) says that “hybridity” or cultural hybridization is a
risky notion, as it is inherently associated with reinforcing and contradicting
concepts, ideas, and themes. However, cultural hybridization is expected to
bring positive and desirable effects to individuals and organizations (Dauber,
2011; Shimoni, 2008). We hope that MNCs learn from this case, overcome
the six tiers of cultural differences, and create a new hybrid organizational
culture for the new company.
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